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Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Revised simulation theory (Goldman, 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.

Publiceringsår

2011

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

503-514

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Synthese

Volym

178

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • mindreading
  • revised simulation theory
  • rationality theory
  • simulation
  • simulation theory
  • theory of mind
  • true false consensus effect
  • egocentric bias
  • quarantine failure
  • theory theory
  • false consensus effect
  • Goldman

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0039-7857