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Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited

Publiceringsår: 2008
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 350-354
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Mathematical Social Sciences
Volym: 56
Nummer: 3
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Elsevier B.V

Sammanfattning

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, Under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics
  • Coalitionally strategy-proofness
  • Fairness
  • Indivisibles

Övriga

Published
Yes
  • ISSN: 0165-4896

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