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Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness

Författare:
Redaktör:
  • A. Abdulkadiroglu
  • Ledyard J.O.
Publiceringsår: 2008
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 321-338
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Review of Economic Design
Volym: 11
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Springer

Sammanfattning

This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics
  • Indivisibles
  • fairness
  • weak fairness
  • strategy-pr

Övrigt

Published
Yes

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