Predicting the Effects of Intervention and Sabotage in a Boundedly Complex Game
Författare
Summary, in English
Conditions for predicting the effects of intervention with certainty are derived. An outside observer studies sequences of actions from a two-person repeated prisoners' dilemma. The sequences are generated by finite automata, which are optimal at each stage of the game and also minimize the number of states. An intervention is a change of action for one of the players and a prediction is a statement about what action the other player will choose in the next period. One result is that predictions can always be made certain at some stages of the game.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
1992
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
321-342
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volym
24
Issue
2-3
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Elsevier
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Complex game
- finite automata
- prisoners' dilemma
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0165-4896