Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2006
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Issue
11
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Working paper
Förlag
Department of Economics, Lund University
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Indivisible objects
- fairness
- coalitionally strat
Status
Published