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Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Publiceringsår: 2006
Språk: Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Nummer: 11
Dokumenttyp: Working paper
Förlag: Department of Economics, Lund University

Sammanfattning

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics
  • Indivisible objects
  • fairness
  • coalitionally strat

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