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Resisting Economic Integration when Industry Location is Uncertain

Författare:
Publiceringsår: 2006
Språk: Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Nummer: 22
Dokumenttyp: Working paper
Förlag: Department of Economics, Lund University

Sammanfattning

This paper analyses the political determination of transportation costs in a new economic geography model. In a benchmark case with certainty about where agglomeration takes place, a majority of voters favour economic integration and the resulting equilibrium is an industrialised core and a de-industrialised periphery. Allowing for uncertainty, a high level of trade costs may win the election and maintain the initial distribution of industry. The reason is that a coalition of risk-averse immobile factors of production votes for the status quo due to uncertainty about which region will attract industry if economic integration is pursued. Finally, the standard view that agglomeration is unambiguously beneficial to residents in the industrial centre is challenged by introducing costs of undertaking economic integration

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics
  • footloose entrepreneur model
  • majority voting
  • new

Övriga

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