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Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and the distribution of money a wage structure. If available money is negative, the formal model may reflect a multi-object auction. In both cases fairness means equilibrium, i.e., that each individual receives a most demanded object.

Publiceringsår

2009

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

227-245

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Economic Theory

Volym

40

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • Multi-object auction
  • Wages
  • Coalitional strategy-proofness
  • Indivisibilities
  • Fairness

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1432-0479