Publikationer
A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited
Avdelning/ar:
Publiceringsår: 2009
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 1719-1724
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Economics Bulletin
Volym: 29
Nummer: 3
Fulltext:
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Sammanfattning
This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.
Disputation
Nyckelord
- Social Sciences
- assignment game
- fairness
- strategy-proofness
Övrigt
Published
Yes
- ISSN: 15452921
