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A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited

Författare:
Publiceringsår: 2009
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 1719-1724
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Economics Bulletin
Volym: 29
Nummer: 3
Dokumenttyp: Artikel

Sammanfattning

This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Social Sciences
  • assignment game
  • fairness
  • strategy-proofness

Övriga

Published
Yes
  • ISSN: 15452921

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