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Counterfactual reasoning in surrogate decision making – another look

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Incompetent patients need to have someone else make decisions on their behalf. According to the Substituted Judgment Standard the surrogate decision maker ought to make the decision that the patient would have made, had he or she been competent. Objections have been raised against this traditional construal of the standard on the grounds that it involves flawed counterfactual reasoning, and amendments have been suggested within the framework of possible worlds semantics. The paper shows that while this approach may circumvent the alleged problem, the way it has so far been elaborated reflects insufficient understanding of the moral underpinnings of the idea of substituted judgment. Proper recognition of these moral underpinnings has potentially far-reaching implications for our normative assumptions about accuracy and objectivity in surrogate decision making.

Publiceringsår

2011

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

244-249

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Bioethics

Volym

25

Issue

5

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Wiley-Blackwell

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

Projekt

  • Research on decisionally incapacitated individuals. A legal study of the Act concerning the Ethical Review of Research Involving Humans, and its application

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0269-9702