Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

Locke and the Non-arbitrary

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

In this article, John Locke's accounts of political liberty and legitimate government are read as expressions of a normative demand for non-arbitrariness. I argue that Locke locates infringements of political liberty in dependence on the arbitrary will of another, whether or not interference or restraint actually takes place. This way Locke is tentatively placed in that tradition of republican thought recently brought to our attention by Pettit, Skinner and others. This reading shifts the focus on legitimacy and identifies the independent moral argument for legitimate government as ruling for the good of the people. Consent is left with a hypothetical role to play.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2003

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

261-279

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

European Journal of Political Theory

Volym

2

Issue

3

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

SAGE Publications

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • dependence
  • government
  • hypothetical consent
  • legitimacy
  • liberty
  • Locke
  • non-arbitrariness
  • public good
  • republicanism
  • trust

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1741-2730