Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

Decision Science : From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, lack a firm conceptual framework, and have no means of producing independent evidence for their case.

Publiceringsår

2010

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

129-143

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Synthese

Volym

172

Issue

1

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Medical and Health Sciences
  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • decision science
  • decision theory
  • human reasoning
  • decision-making
  • dual process theory
  • rationality
  • prospect theory
  • economic man
  • Ramsey
  • normative man
  • expected utility

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0039-7857