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Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

Publiceringsår: 2012
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 663-688
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Theoretical Economics
Volym: 7
Nummer: 3
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Econometric Society

Sammanfattning

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics
  • Multiple public goods
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Voting under constraints
  • Additive preferences
  • Separable preferences

Övrigt

Published
Yes
  • ISSN: 1555-7561
  • ISSN: 1933-6837

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