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Social laws should be conceived as a special case of mechanisms: A reply to Daniel Little

Författare:
Publiceringsår: 2012
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 12-14
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Volym: 1
Nummer: 7
Dokumenttyp: Artikel

Sammanfattning

I am grateful to Daniel Little for his insightful reply to my recent article in Social Epistemology (2012, 105-114) about what appears to be a flaw in Jon Elster’s conception of mechanisms. I agree with much of what Little says, but want to amplify a different underlying problem with Elster’s conception (fourth point below) than Little suggests in his reply (third point below). This underlying problem connects nicely with a passage in Little’s reply, which he thinks unconnected with the point on which I focus.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Social Sciences
  • Philosophy and Religion
  • social explanation
  • Jon Elster
  • mechanistic explanation
  • covering law

Övriga

  • Vetenskapsrådet
  • Formas and Lund university
Published
Yes

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