Social laws should be conceived as a special case of mechanisms : A reply to Daniel Little
Författare
Summary, in English
I am grateful to Daniel Little for his insightful reply to my recent article in Social Epistemology (2012, 105-114) about what appears to be a flaw in Jon Elster’s conception of mechanisms. I agree with much of what Little says, but want to amplify a different underlying problem with Elster’s conception (fourth point below) than Little suggests in his reply (third point below). This underlying problem connects nicely with a passage in Little’s reply, which he thinks unconnected with the point on which I focus.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2012
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
12-14
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Volym
1
Issue
7
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 102 kB
- Download statistics
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Ämne
- Philosophy
- Educational Sciences
Nyckelord
- social explanation
- Jon Elster
- mechanistic explanation
- covering law
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 2471-9560