Social mechanisms and explaining how: A reply to Kimberly Chuang
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Kimberly Chuang’s detailed and very helpful reply to my article (2012a) concerns Jon Elster’s struggle to develop a mechanistic account that sheds light on explanation in social science. I argue that a problem exists with Elster’s current conception of mechanistic explanation in social contexts. Chuang (2012) defends Elster’s conception against my critique. I still believe I have identified a problem with Elster’s conception. In this reply I want to recapitulate briefly Elster’s idea, as I understand it, and then use some of Chuang’s critical points to advance the position I advocate.
- Educational Sciences
- causal explanation
- social explanation
- mechanistic explanation
- Lund university