An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions
Författare
Summary, in Swedish
Abstract in Undetermined
This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220–245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts.
This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220–245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2012
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
99-101
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Economics Letters
Volym
116
Issue
1
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Elsevier
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Price uniformity
- Efficiency
- Cross-bidding
- Competing auctions
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0165-1765