Value Grounded on Attitudes. Subjectivism in Value Theory
Författare
Summary, in Swedish
Popular Abstract in English
Does subjectivism in value theory — the view that value is grounded on attitudes — imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes? Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake? Are subjectivists disqualified from talking about intrinsic value? Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?
In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.
Does subjectivism in value theory — the view that value is grounded on attitudes — imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes? Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake? Are subjectivists disqualified from talking about intrinsic value? Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?
In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2014
Språk
Engelska
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 40 MB
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Dokumenttyp
Doktorsavhandling
Förlag
Lund University (Media-Tryck)
Ämne
- Philosophy
Nyckelord
- Subjectivism
- objectivism
- relativism
- absolutism
- value and attitudes
- supervenience and constitutive ground of value
- final value
- intrinsic value
- good and good for
- motivational internalism
- idealization
- value projection
- error and evaluative language
Status
Published
Handledare
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISBN: 978-91-7473-994-7
Försvarsdatum
13 september 2014
Försvarstid
10:15
Försvarsplats
C126, LUX, Helgonavägen 3, Lund
Opponent
- Ulrike Heuer (Associate Professor)