Can Economics Explain Where All Inclusive Deals Are Offered?
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper investigates why all-inclusive travel packages are offered at some hotels but not at others. Using the theory of transaction cost, it is argued that all-inclusive contracts mitigate a hold-up problem and that the severity of this problem varies with regard to the hotel's distance from the resort centre. This hypothesis is tested empirically against data from 3,798 hotel offers and is strongly supported. Additionally, some country-specific mechanisms related to the general price level and the degree of corruption are analysed. Countries with all-inclusive offers are characterized by a low price level and high corruption.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2013
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
339-348
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Tourism Economics
Volym
19
Issue
2
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
IP Publishing LTD
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- ALL-INCLUSIVE CONTRACTS
- HOLD-UP PROBLEM
- HOTEL STRATEGIES
- TRANSACTION COST
- TRAVEL PACKAGES
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1354-8166