What to do with a forecast?
Författare
Summary, in English
In the literature one nds two non-equivalent responses to forecasts; deference and updating. Herein it is demonstrated that, under certain conditions, both responses are entirely determined by one's beliefs as regards the calibration of the forecaster. Further it is argued that the choice as to whether to defer to, or update on, a forecast is determined by the aim of the recipient of that forecast. If the aim of the recipient is to match their credence with the prevailing objective chances, they should defer to the forecast; if it
is to maximize the veritistic value of their beliefs, they should update on the forecast.
is to maximize the veritistic value of their beliefs, they should update on the forecast.
Avdelning/ar
- Teoretisk filosofi
- Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Publiceringsår
2014
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
1881-1907
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Synthese
Volym
191
Issue
8
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Springer
Ämne
- Philosophy
Nyckelord
- Deference
- Forecast
- Calibration
- Bayesianism
Status
Published
Forskningsgrupp
- Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0039-7857