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How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.

Publiceringsår

2014

Språk

Engelska

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University

Volym

24

Dokumenttyp

Working paper

Förlag

Department of Economics, Lund University

Ämne

  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • Ascending auction
  • assignment market
  • price control
  • Pareto efficiency
  • core

Status

Published