Bivalence and future contingency
Författare
Redaktör
- Vincent Hendricks
- Sven Ove Hansson
Summary, in English
This work presents an overview of four different approaches to the problem of future contingency and determinism in temporal logics. All of them are bivalent, viz. they share the assumption that propositions
concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value (true or false). We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and T x W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness and their underlying metaphysics of time.
concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value (true or false). We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and T x W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness and their underlying metaphysics of time.
Avdelning/ar
- Teoretisk filosofi
- Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Publiceringsår
2014
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Handbook of Formal Philosophy
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 377 kB
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Dokumenttyp
Del av eller Kapitel i bok
Förlag
Springer
Ämne
- Philosophy
Status
Inpress
Forskningsgrupp
- Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)