Non-Cognitivism and Validity
Författare
Summary, in English
In this paper I defend against a certain objection the view that it is possible to account for validity and kindred notions for moral language within a non-cognitivist framework by appeal to the descriptive meaning of moral terms. The objection is that such an account leads to an asymmetry in the accounts it offers for synonymy in different contexts; in certain contexts it holds that sameness of meaning for a moral term depends on its evaluative meaning, in other contexts that it depends on the term's descriptive meaning. In the third part of the paper I try to show why non-cognitivists should be prepared to live with that asymmetry. In the process I also deal with two other objections.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2007
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
121-147
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy
Volym
73
Issue
2
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Thales
Ämne
- Philosophy
Nyckelord
- validity
- descriptive meaning
- Non-cognitivism
- inference
- attitudes
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0040-5825