Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms
Författare
Summary, in English
Abstract in Undetermined
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one
doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is
normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is
suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought
not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I
argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we
have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because
violating norms.
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one
doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is
normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is
suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought
not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I
argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we
have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because
violating norms.
Avdelning/ar
- Teoretisk filosofi
- CogComlab
Publiceringsår
2014
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
445-464
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology
Volym
5
Issue
4
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 149 kB
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Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch
Ämne
- Philosophy
Status
Published
Forskningsgrupp
- CogComlab
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 2069-0533