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Is There an Optimal Strategic Oil Reserve for Each Country? A Study Based on the Game Theory

In English

Författare

  • Junan Yang
  • Ronggang Cong

Summary, in English

In generally, there is a phenomenon of “free rider” in the establishment of national oil reserves for different countries, which means that they have the tendency of underestimating the strategic oil reserves. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon from the perspective of non-cooperative game theory. It also analyzes the establishment of strategic oil reserve among different countries based on the coalition game theory and presents the core solution for it. The results show that based on a certain constraint mechanism, it is feasible for different countries to establish their own suitable strategic oil reserves in theory and practice.

Publiceringsår

2014

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

69-72

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

The Open Fuels & Energy Science Journal

Volym

7

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Bentham Open

Ämne

  • Earth and Related Environmental Sciences

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1876-973X