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Aggregation of value judgments differs from aggregation of preferences

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: The kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in similarity maximization, or – more precisely – in minimization of the average distance from individual inputs. When applied to judgment aggregation, this procedure can also be approached from the epistemic perspective: the questions are posed concerning its advantages as a truth-tracker. From that perspective, what matters is not only the probability of the outcome of the procedure being true, but also the expected verisimilitude of the outcome: its expected distance from truth.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2016

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

9-40

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities

Dokumenttyp

Del av eller Kapitel i bok

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • value
  • preference
  • ranking
  • similarity
  • distance-based methods
  • aggregation
  • truth-tracking

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0303-8157
  • ISBN: 978-90-04-31265-4
  • ISBN: 978-900431910-3