Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

How choice blindness vindicates wholeheartedness

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Recently the account of free will proposed by Harry Frankfurt has come under attack. It has been argued that Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness is in conflict with prevalent intuitions about free will and should be abandoned. I will argue that empirical data from choice blindness experiments can vindicate Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness. The choice blindness phenomenon exposes that individuals fail to track their own decisions and readily take ownership of, and confabulate reasons for, decisions they did not make. Traditionally this has been taken to be problem for the notion of free will. I argue that Frankfurt’s account does not face this problem. Instead, choice blindness can be fruitfully applied to it, and vice versa. Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness, I suggest, delineates the range of the choice blindness effect. This makes wholeheartedness a useful meta-theoretical concept for choice blindness research. I conclude that, pace the recent criticism, wholeheartedness is a useful notion and should not be abandoned.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2015

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

199-210

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Organon F

Volym

22

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • Choice Blindness
  • Decisions
  • Free Will
  • Harry Frankfurt
  • Wholeheartedness

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1335-0668