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Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian

In English

Författare

  • George Masterton

Summary, in English

According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson's prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson's calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson's original proposal.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2015

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

403-432

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Erkenntnis

Volym

80

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • Equivocation
  • Calibration
  • Objective Bayesianism
  • Entropy maximization
  • Jon Williamson

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1572-8420