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Subjunctive Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Reason Distinction

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of a normative agent-neutral reason is undermined by certain views on reasons; the existence of agent-neutral reasons can be questioned. Here I shall not repeat my doubts but rather address a way of expressing the distinction that I had not considered and which would, if correct, put an end to my worries about the soundness of this dichotomy. The idea, which was suggested to me by Douglas Portmore (personal communication) is that normative reasons are facts of a peculiar kind: they are subjunctive facts of a certain kind.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2010

Språk

Engelska

Dokumenttyp

Konferensbidrag

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • agent-relative reason
  • agent-neutral reason
  • couter-factual
  • subjunctive facts

Conference name

Workshop: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Conference date

2010-04-29 - 2010-04-30

Conference place

Münster, Germany

Status

Unpublished

Projekt

  • On Our Good Reasons