Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents: The State of the Art
Författare
Summary, in English
Recent work on conditional reasoning argues that denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming the consequent [AC] are defeasible but cogent patterns of argument, either because they are effective, rational, albeit heuristic applications of Bayesian probability, or because they are licensed by the principle of total evidence. Against this, we show that on any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals the premises of DA and AC arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather depends on contingent factors extrinsic to, and independent of, what is asserted by DA and AC arguments.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2015
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
88-134
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Informal Logic
Volym
35
Issue
1
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Informal Logic, University of Windsor, ON, Canada
Ämne
- Philosophy
Nyckelord
- affirming the consequent
- Bayesian probability
- conditional perfection
- denying the antecedent
- fallacy
- heuristics
- total evidence
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0824-2577