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Two General Attacks on Pomaranch-like Keystream Generators

  • Alex Biryukov
Publiceringsår: 2007
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 274-289
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Fast Software Encryption / Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volym: 4593
Dokumenttyp: Konferensbidrag
Förlag: Springer


Two general attacks that can be applied to all versions and variants of the Pomaranch stream cipher are presented. The attacks are demonstrated on all versions and succeed with complexity less than exhaustive keysearch. The first attack is a distinguisher which needs keystream from only one or a few IVs to succeed. The attack is not only successful on Pomaranch Version 3 but has also less computational complexity than all previously known distinguishers for the first two versions of the cipher. The second attack is an attack which requires keystream from an amount of IVs exponential in the state size. It can be used as a distinguisher but it can also be used to predict future keystream bits corresponding to an IV if the first few bits are known. The attack will succeed on all versions of Pomaranch with complexities much lower than previously known attacks.



  • Technology and Engineering
  • distinguishing attack
  • Stream ciphers
  • Pomaranch.
  • resynchronization attack


14th International Workshop, FSE 2007
Luxembourg, March 26-28, 2007
  • Informations- och kommunikationsteori
  • ISSN: 0302-9743
  • ISBN: 978-3-540-74617-1

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