Publikationer
A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
Avdelning/ar:
Publiceringsår: 2007
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 398-401
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Economics Letters
Volym: 95
Nummer: 3
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: Elsevier
Sammanfattning
Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Disputation
Nyckelord
- Business and Economics
- repeated
- noncooperative game theory
- weak renegotiation-proofness
- bertrand games
Övrigt
Published
Yes
- ISSN: 0165-1765
