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Sovereignty and the Personality of the State

Författare

Redaktör

  • Robert Schuett
  • Peter M. R. Stirk

Summary, in English

n international law, states are assumed to be persons by virtue of being bearers of rights and obligations. This chapter provides a brief genealogy of the person of the state. It shows how the concept of sovereignty — first understood as supreme and indivisible authority within a given polity — helped early modern authors to account for the temporal continuity of states, and also allowed them to attribute rights and obligations to such fictitious entities. It then shows how this conception of sovereignty was instrumental when attributing a capacity for autonomous action to the natural person of sovereign, and how the subsequent redefinition of sovereignty in terms of external independence helped to relocate that capacity to the state as a whole. Finally, it describes how this view of the state as an independent entity came to constitute the baseline for the theory of recognition, according to which states take on their personality as a consequence of being recognized as persons by other states.

Publiceringsår

2015

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

81-107

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

The Concept of the State in International Relations: : Philosophy, Sovereignty, and Cosmopolitanism

Dokumenttyp

Del av eller Kapitel i bok

Förlag

Edinburgh University Press

Ämne

  • Political Science

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISBN: 0748693629