Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures
Författare
Summary, in English
The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple framework combining contractual incompleteness with the existence of an imperfect but contractible performance measure. Contractual incompleteness gives rise to two regimes, identified with make and buy. The performance measure on which comprehensive contracts can be written is imperfect in the sense of being subject to manipulation. The performance incentives faced by the agent are stronger in the “buy” regime. A positive (negative) impact – or ”externality” – of manipulation on true performance favors make (buy).
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2011
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volym
11
Issue
1
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Berkeley Electronic Press
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- make-or-buy decision
- manipulation
- outsourcing
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1935-1704