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Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewiss coherence argument

Författare

Summary, in English

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis’s view on the role of coherence – what

he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis

has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent

items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has

some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of

independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies

– raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification,

or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”. It turns out that, while

the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis’s account of

independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability – a connection

of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory – is contingent on

the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter

fact for Lewis’s theory in particular and for coherence justification in general.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2004

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

21-41

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Synthese

Volym

142

Issue

1

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Nyckelord

  • Lewis coherence congruence

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0039-7857