Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewiss coherence argument
Författare
Summary, in English
In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis’s view on the role of coherence – what
he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis
has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent
items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has
some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of
independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies
– raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification,
or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”. It turns out that, while
the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis’s account of
independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability – a connection
of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory – is contingent on
the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter
fact for Lewis’s theory in particular and for coherence justification in general.
he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis
has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent
items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has
some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of
independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies
– raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification,
or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”. It turns out that, while
the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis’s account of
independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability – a connection
of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory – is contingent on
the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter
fact for Lewis’s theory in particular and for coherence justification in general.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2004
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
21-41
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Synthese
Volym
142
Issue
1
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Springer
Ämne
- Philosophy
Nyckelord
- Lewis coherence congruence
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0039-7857