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Good, Good For, and Good Relative To : Relative and Relational in Value Theory

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

This paper discusses how we are to understand claims to the effect that something is good relative to a person. It is argued that goodness relative to should not be equated with good for as the latter is a relational value notion and the former is a value theoretical notion. It is argued further that good relative to a person should be understood as good from the perspective or the point of view of the person. But this analysis of the notion ‘good relative to’ leaves open questions about the full nature of relative goodness. For that, a positive proposal about what it is for something to be good relative to a person’s point of view is needed. One such proposal is put forward on which the relevant perspective is determined or fixed in terms of the pro and con attitudes of the individual person.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2016

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

255-267

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Philosophy

Volym

91

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Cambridge University Press

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0031-8191