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Career concerns, contracts, and effort distortions

Publiceringsår: 2002
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 42-58
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Journal of Labor Economics
Volym: 20
Nummer: 1
Dokumenttyp: Artikel
Förlag: University of Chicago

Sammanfattning

A two-period, career-concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker's ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Business and Economics

Övriga

Published
Yes
  • ISSN: 0734-306X

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