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Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the light kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2006

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

114-120

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Philosophical Quarterly

Volym

56

Issue

222

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Oxford University Press

Ämne

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0031-8094