Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2008
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
181-196
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Social Choice and Welfare
Volym
30
Issue
2
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Springer
Ämne
- Economics
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0176-1714