Of boundaries and metaphysical starting points: why the extended mind cannot be so lightly dismissed
Författare
Summary, in English
The extended mind debate is, to large extent, a debate over where and how to locate the boundary between cognitive mind and non-cognitive world. Concepts of “internal” and “external”, taken from the domain of physical volumes, are metaphorical, at best, applied to entities like mind. Strongly held intuitions betray metaphysical starting points that prejudice the debate. If one does not accept these starting points, then the “just obvious” claims made by critics of extended mind are far less clear. The mind/world distinction is, ultimately, a conceptual one, and like most if not all conceptual distinctions, subject to shift over time.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2011
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
79-94
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Teorema
Volym
30
Issue
2
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
KRK Ediciones
Ämne
- Languages and Literature
Nyckelord
- boundary
- intuitions
- realism
- anti-realism
- enactivism
Status
Published
Projekt
- Centre for Cognitive Semiotics (RJ)
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0210-1602