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Explanations are about concepts and concept formation

Redaktör:
Publiceringsår: 2007
Språk: Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Rethinking Explanation
Dokumenttyp: Del av eller Kapitel i bok
Förlag: Springer

Sammanfattning

In this paper, I wish to argue that an explanation is not a logical structure¸ that it cannot be characterised in syntactic terms, but that it is rather an epistemological structure, and, more specifically, a structure organising conceptual content. I will start from a trivial example and systematically look at the effects of making premises more general or more specific or of reshuffling the same content into another set of premises, thereby exposing the implicit suppositions and consequences of some commonly held views and showing their untenability.

Disputation

Nyckelord

  • Philosophy and Religion

Övriga

  • NOS-H
Published
  • ISBN: 978-1-4020-5580-5

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