Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings
Författare
Summary, in English
Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2004
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.
Dokumenttyp
Rapport
Förlag
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
Ämne
- Psychology
Status
Published
Report number
2004:1
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1404-3718