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Predicting the Effects of Intervention and Sabotage in a Boundedly Complex Game

Författare:
Publiceringsår: 1992
Språk: Engelska
Sidor: 321-342
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Mathematical Social Sciences
Volym: 24
Nummer: 2-3
Dokumenttyp: Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag: Elsevier

Sammanfattning

Conditions for predicting the effects of intervention with certainty are derived. An outside observer studies sequences of actions from a two-person repeated prisoners' dilemma. The sequences are generated by finite automata, which are optimal at each stage of the game and also minimize the number of states. An intervention is a change of action for one of the players and a prediction is a statement about what action the other player will choose in the next period. One result is that predictions can always be made certain at some stages of the game.

Nyckelord

  • Economics
  • Complex game
  • finite automata
  • prisoners' dilemma

Övriga

Published
  • ISSN: 0165-4896

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