Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in great apes (Commentary on K. Vaesen “The cognitive basis of human tool use”)

Summary, in English

We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

• Författare: Mathias Osvath; Tomas Persson; Peter Gärdenfors
• Avdelning/ar: Kognitionsvetenskap; LUCS Cognitive Zoology Group
• Publiceringsår: 2012
• Språk: Engelska
• Sidor: 234-235
• Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
• Volym: 35
• Issue: 4
• Länkar: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11002068
• Dokumenttyp: Artikel i tidskrift
• Förlag: Cambridge University Press
• Ämne: Zoology; Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology); Learning; General Language Studies and Linguistics
• Status: Published
• Forskningsgrupp: Lund University Cognitive Science (LUCS); LUCS Cognitive Zoology Group
• ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt: ISSN: 1469-1825