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Social laws should be conceived as a special case of mechanisms : A reply to Daniel Little

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

I am grateful to Daniel Little for his insightful reply to my recent article in Social Epistemology (2012, 105-114) about what appears to be a flaw in Jon Elster’s conception of mechanisms. I agree with much of what Little says, but want to amplify a different underlying problem with Elster’s conception (fourth point below) than Little suggests in his reply (third point below). This underlying problem connects nicely with a passage in Little’s reply, which he thinks unconnected with the point on which I focus.

Publiceringsår

2012

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

12-14

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective

Volym

1

Issue

7

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Ämne

  • Philosophy
  • Educational Sciences

Nyckelord

  • social explanation
  • Jon Elster
  • mechanistic explanation
  • covering law

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 2471-9560