On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
Författare
Summary, in English
In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2012
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
504-507
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Economics Letters
Volym
115
Issue
3
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Elsevier
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Beliefs
- Sequential equilibrium
- Existence
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0165-1765