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Whatever it is better to be than not to be

Författare

Summary, in English

The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.

Avdelning/ar

Publiceringsår

2013

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

131-143

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Volym

74

Issue

1

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Religious Studies

Nyckelord

  • Anselm
  • God
  • Universal value-commensurability
  • Greatness
  • Possibilism
  • Actualism
  • Morality
  • Actuality

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0020-7047