Uniting Against Autocrats : Opposition Coordination, Turnovers and Democratization by Elections
Författare
Summary, in English
As counter intuitive as it might sound, autocracy without elections is a rare combination today. Elections do not constitute democracy, but they can promote democratization. This dissertation studies the process of democratization through elections, focusing on the effect of opposition coordination. Several authors have stressed the importance of opposition coordination as an explanation for democratization by elections, emphasizing how a coordinated opposition increases the electoral pressure on incumbent regimes and enhances the probability of electoral turnovers. However, little research has been done investigating the causes for opposition coordination under electoral authoritarianism, or studying the more long-term consequences of coordination beyond the electoral outcome. This dissertation does so in four independent, but related, articles probing the overall question: How is democratization by elections achieved and what causal explanatory power can be attributed to opposition coordination for obtaining democratizing outcomes in authoritarian elections?
Using statistical evidence from electoral authoritarian regimes around the globe, together with in-depth case studies of three African countries, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, the findings diverge substantially from much of the previous research. The general causal relationship between opposition coordination and democratization by elections is questioned. It is argued that much of the previous literature has confused alternation with democratization. Oppositional politicians radically change their institutional preferences once they assume office, and although coordination increases the prospects for turnovers, it often does not result in long-term democratization. In cases where parties are poorly institutionalized and appeal to voters through patronage rather than through different distinguishable policy agendas, coordination often reflects the probability of election turnovers rather than causes democratization.
Using statistical evidence from electoral authoritarian regimes around the globe, together with in-depth case studies of three African countries, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, the findings diverge substantially from much of the previous research. The general causal relationship between opposition coordination and democratization by elections is questioned. It is argued that much of the previous literature has confused alternation with democratization. Oppositional politicians radically change their institutional preferences once they assume office, and although coordination increases the prospects for turnovers, it often does not result in long-term democratization. In cases where parties are poorly institutionalized and appeal to voters through patronage rather than through different distinguishable policy agendas, coordination often reflects the probability of election turnovers rather than causes democratization.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2012
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Lund Political Studies
Issue
165
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 480 kB
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Dokumenttyp
Doktorsavhandling
Förlag
Lund University
Ämne
- Political Science
Nyckelord
- Democratization
- authoritarianism
- election
- party
- opposition
- coalition
- ethnic
- Africa
- Kenya
- Ghana
- Senegal
Status
Published
Handledare
- Jan Teorell
- Staffan I Lindberg
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0460-0037
- ISBN: 978-91-88306-82-1
Försvarsdatum
27 april 2012
Försvarstid
10:00
Försvarsplats
Edens Hörsal, Paradisgatan 5H, Lund
Opponent
- Andreas Schedler