Webbläsaren som du använder stöds inte av denna webbplats. Alla versioner av Internet Explorer stöds inte längre, av oss eller Microsoft (läs mer här: * https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Var god och använd en modern webbläsare för att ta del av denna webbplats, som t.ex. nyaste versioner av Edge, Chrome, Firefox eller Safari osv.

Offices and policies – Why do oppositional parties form pre-electoral coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes?

In English

Författare

  • Michael Wahman

Summary, in English

Although previous research has suggested that the opposition’s ability to form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) in authoritarian elections is crucial for the electoral outcome, little has been written about why and when such coalitions are formed. The aim of this article is to fill this empirical and theoretical gap. A theory that combines oppositional parties’ office- and policy-gaining potential when creating such coalitions is proposed. The article utilizes a unique database of 111 competitive authoritarian elections and provides a representative sample of strategically chosen cases. It is shown that, coalitions are more likely when structural conditions favor oppositional victories and when oppositional parties have a distinctive policy agenda in relation to the incumbent government. These factors are shown to be more important than electoral institutions.

Publiceringsår

2011

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

642-657

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Electoral Studies

Volym

30

Issue

4

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Elsevier

Ämne

  • Political Science

Nyckelord

  • Coalition
  • Authoritarian
  • Party
  • Opposition
  • Policy
  • Democratization
  • Election

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 1873-6890