A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2009
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
1719-1724
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Economics Bulletin
Volym
29
Issue
3
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 89 kB
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Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Economics Bulletin
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- assignment game
- fairness
- strategy-proofness
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1545-2921