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Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm

In English

Författare

Summary, in English

This paper investigates algorithmic properties and overall performance of the exact auction algorithm in Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (J. Polit. Economy 94: 863-872, 1986) or DGS for short. This task is achieved by interpreting DGS as a graph and by conducting a large number of computer simulations. The crucial step in DGS is when the auctioneer selects a so-called minimal overdemanded set of items because the specific selection may affect a number of performance measures such as the number of iterations and the ratio of elicited preferences. The computational results show that (i) DGS graphs are typically large even for relatively small numbers of bidders and items, (ii) DGS converges slowly and (iii) DGS performs well in terms of preference elicitation. The paper also demonstrates that the modification to DGS based on the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm outperforms all investigated rules for selecting a minimal overdemanded set of items in DGS both in terms of termination speed and preference elicitation.

Publiceringsår

2012

Språk

Engelska

Sidor

113-133

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Computational Economics

Volym

39

Issue

2

Dokumenttyp

Artikel i tidskrift

Förlag

Springer

Ämne

  • Economics and Business
  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • Multi-item auctions
  • Algorithmic properties
  • Graphs
  • Computer
  • simulations

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt

  • ISSN: 0927-7099