Strategic Self-Ignorance
Författare
Summary, in English
We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to overindulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals—a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.
Avdelning/ar
Publiceringsår
2016-04-10
Språk
Engelska
Fulltext
Dokumenttyp
Working paper
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- experiment
- ignorance
- food
- harmful activities
Status
Published